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THE NONUNIFORM TEXAS "UNIFORM"
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT
by
Richard F Dole, Jr. * and Vernon Teofan**
RAUDULENT transfer law limits a debtor's ability to frustrate cred-
itors by transferring assets to third parties. Except to the extent that a
transferee derives immunity through a bona fide purchase, I an ag-
grieved creditor can satisfy a claim from a transferee's assets, including the
property fraudulently transferred.2 Fraudulent transfers primarily injure
unsecured creditors. But adversely affected secured creditors, for example
those with insufficient collateral, also can seek redress.
3
American fraudulent transfer law derived from sixteenth-century English
* B.A., Bates College; J.D., Cornell Law School. B.W. Young Professor, University of
Houston Law Center, Houston, Texas. Member, Ad Hoc Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
Committee, Business Law Section, State Bar of Texas.
** B.A., J.D., University of Notre Dame. Shareholder, Jenkens & Gilchrist, Dallas,
Texas. Chair, Ad Hoc Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act Committee, Business Law Section,
State Bar of Texas.
1. See Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 814-15 (Star Chamber 1601) (protection requires
valuable consideration given in good faith); Carlson, Is Fraudulent Conveyance Law Efficient?,
9 CARDOZO L. REV. 643, 651 (1987) ("The normative command of fraudulent conveyance
law is that insolvent debtors should not make gifts, nor should they launder gifts or other
corrupt deals through co-conspiring third parties (bulk sales).").
Fraudulent transfer law also invalidates fraudulently incurred obligations, which can be pre-
texts for fraudulent transfers. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); UNIF. FRAUDU-
LENT CONVEYANCE ACT §§ 4-8, 7A U.L.A. 474-577 (1985); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER
ACT §§ 4, 5, 7A U.L.A. 652-58 (1985). Although the Texas Fraudulent Transfer Act, ch. 785,
§ 1, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 2598-99 (§§ 24.01-.05) (with the exception of one provision, pro-
spectively repealed 1987) [hereinafter TFTA], did not expressly apply to an "obligation in-
curred," transfers made to satisfy or secure a sham obligation have been voided as fraudulent.
E.g., Stevens v. Cobern, 109 Tex. 574, 576, 213 S.W. 925, 925-26 (1919) (335 acres of land
purportedly transferred to satisfy sham note). See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text for
discussion of the prospective repeal of TFTA.
2. E.g., Mannocke's Case, 73 Eng. Rep. 661-63 (K.B. 1571) (transferred property subject
to levy by creditor of transferor); see Alan Drey Co. v. Generation, Inc., 317 N.E.2d 673, 675,
680-81 (Ill. App. 1974) ($98,376 personal judgment against unprotected transferee). Transfer-
ees who are natural persons, however, are entitled to claim state law property exemptions from
creditor judicial collection remedies in property that was not acquired through a fraudulent
transfer. See, e.g. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 42.002, 42.004 (Vernon 1984) (personal prop-
erty exemptions for families and single adults allowed unless property acquired with nonex-
empt assets with intent to defraud, delay, or hinder an interested person). As an
accommodation to fraudulent transfer policy, personal property acquired by an unprotected
transferee in a constructively fraudulent transfer also arguably should be ineligible for
exemption.
3. E.g., Davis v. Nielson, 515 P.2d 995, 1000 (Wash. App. 1973) (aggrieved secured
creditor could maintain action under Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act).
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common law.4 Both the early English proscription of fraudulent transfers
and the American derivatives were statute-based. The sixteenth-century
English cases created a creditor's remedy from a statute making a fraudulent
transfer a criminal offense.5 In the United States, uniform state laws pro-
vided express creditor remedies. Twenty-five states and the Virgin Island
enacted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA), which the Uni-
form Law Conference adopted in 1918.6 Twenty states have at present en-
acted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), which in 1984
replaced the UFCA as the recommended uniform act.7 At the federal level,
the 1979 federal Bankruptcy Code authorized a bankruptcy trustee to void
fraudulent transfers and to recover the property involved or its value from
unprotected transferees.8 A bankruptcy trustee can, alternatively, bring a
voiding action under state fraudulent transfer law. 9
Texas never enacted the UFCA. In 1987 the legislature replaced the
Texas Fraudulent Transfer Act, 10 which was derived from an 1840 Act of
the Republic of Texas, II with a modified version of the UFTA. 12 This Arti-
cle examines the eleven Texas nonuniform amendments to the UFTA and
generally finds them flawed. These amendments were not the subject of
committee deliberations. Most were drafted immediately following a Senate
Committee hearing. A few were adopted without debate upon the Senate
floor during final consideration. The Texas nonuniform amendments typi-
cally reflect the haste with which they were prepared and conflict with either
the approach or the language of the UFTA. 13
4. Kennedy, Involuntary Fraudulent Transfers, 9 CARDOZo L. REV. 531, 536-37 (1987).
5. E.g., Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 810-11, 823 (Star Chamber 1601) (fraudulent
transferee convicted of crime of fraud; his minions, who had interfered with sheriff, convicted
of riot); Kennedy, supra note 4, at 536-37 (English statutes condemned fraudulent transfers for
several centuries before courts recognized creditor voiding actions).
6. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 7A U.L.A. 427 (1985 & Supp. 1988) (table
of jurisdictions adopting). Arizona, California, Delaware, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mex-
ico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have adopted the fraudulent conveyance act.
7. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985 & Supp. 1988) (table of
jurisdictions adopting). Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, Ne-
vada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin have adopted the fraudulent
transfer act.
8. 11 U.S.C. §§ 548, 550 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
9. Id. §§ 544(b), 550. In order to invoke state law, a trustee must identify an unsecured
creditor of the debtor with both standing under state law and a claim that is "allowable"
(cognizable) in the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. § 544(b). Federal bankruptcy law empowers a
trustee to utilize an identifiable unsecured creditor's power of avoidance for the benefit of a
debtor's bankruptcy estate. Id.; In re McDowell, 87 Bankr. 554, 558-61 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1988)
(trustee's ability to proceed depends upon the existence of at least one creditor with a right of
avoidance).
10. See TFTA, supra note 1, §§ 24.01-.05.
11. See id. 169, 170, 215, 233, 238 (historical notes).
12. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 24.001-.013 (Vernon 1987).
13. See infra notes 110-73 and accompanying text.
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I. THE TEXAS FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT
The Texas Act dealt with voluntary transfers of a debtor's property.'
4
The Act covered involuntary transfers, like those caused by legal process,
only to the extent that a debtor used a collusive proceeding to disguise a
voluntary transfer.' 5 Transfers made with actual intent to delay, hinder, or
defraud creditors, purchasers, or other interested persons were voidable. 16
Three additional categories of constructively fraudulent transfers were void-
able without proof of actual intent to defraud: (1) transfers for unfair con-
sideration by insolvent debtors;1 7 (2) fraudulent gifts of tangible personal
property;18 and (3) pretended loans of tangible personal property.19
The invalidation of fraudulent gifts and pretended loans did not involve
fraudulent transfer policy. Unless evidenced by either (1) an acknowledged
or a proved and recorded deed, or (2) a probated will, or (3) possession by a
donee or a person claiming under a donee, a gift of tangible personal prop-
erty was voidable. 20 As the exceptions indicated, the primary function of the
fraudulent gift statute was to identify the formalities for an effective gift of
tangible personal property. Rowe v. Palmer,2 1 for example, was an action by
two brothers against their sister for failure to convey property. The court
granted the sister judgment notwithstanding the verdict for several reasons,
including noncompliance with the formalities of the fraudulent gift statute.
22
With respect to creditors of and purchasers from a person who had been
in unchallenged possession of another's tangible personal property for two
years, the pretended loan statute voided reservations and limitations upon
the possessor's rights, including reservations of title.23 The pretended loan
statute also had a primarily evidentiary function. Reservations and limita-
tions that appeared either in a probated will or in an acknowledged or a
proved and recorded writing were enforceable. 24
If a debtor made a transfer with actual intent to defraud them, creditors,
purchasers, and other interested persons with interests that arose either
before or after the transfer could maintain a voiding action. 25 In Biccochi v.
Casey-Swasey Co. 26 the Texas Supreme Court indicated in dictum that a wife
14. TFTA, supra note 1, § 24.01 (transfers include conveyances, gifts, assignments, and
charges).
15. See id. § 24.02(a) (suit, decree, judgment, or execution involving actual fraudulent
intent voidable).
16. Id.
17. Id. § 24.03.
18. Id. § 24.04.
19. Id. § 24.05.
20. Id. § 24.04.
21. 277 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1955, no writ).
22. Id. at 782-83, 785 (no exceptions to fraudulent gift statute applicable).
23. TFTA, supra note 1, § 24.05.
24. Id. § 24.05(c); Grumbles v. Sneed, 22 Tex. 565, 579 (1858) ("We think it intended to
compel persons who make loans of goods... to have the loan declared in such manner, that all
the world may know what title the possessor has.").
25. See TFTA, supra note 1, § 24.02(a); see also United States v. Chapman, 756 F.2d
1237, 1240-43 (5th Cir. 1985) (United States could void transfer of real estate made with actual
intent to hinder collection of federal taxes prior to accrual of tax claim).
26. 91 Tex. 259, 42 S.W. 963 (1897).
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whose husband secretly had purchased land with community funds could
void the record title of her husband's brother-in-law. 27 The court suggested
that the wife would have standing under what ultimately became the inter-
ested person category and perhaps also as a creditor.28
Transfers for unfair consideration by insolvent debtors, on the other hand,
were voidable only by creditors holding claims against a debtor that arose
before or at the time of the transfer. 29 An archaic definition of insolvency
enhanced voidability. The Texas Fraudulent Transfer Act deemed insolvent
any debtor who lacked "enough property in this state subject to execution to
pay all of his existing debts."' 30 This 1840 definition of insolvency counted
all of a transferor's debts, but excluded substantial assets. Intangible assets
subject to a Texas writ of garnishment rather than to a Texas writ of execu-
tion were, for example, omitted. In Taylor v. Callahan 3' the court deemed a
debtor insolvent solely because the Act excluded two Texas bank accounts
from the solvency calculation! 32 Also omitted were all assets located outside
Texas. 33 Multinational and multistate entities, as well as entities with pri-
marily intangible assets such as accounts receivable, were exposed to a
greater likelihood of artificial "insolvency" than Texas concerns with sub-
stantial tangible assets.
The Act immunized from voidability good faith acquirers for value who
were without notice of a debtor's actual intent to defraud. 34 Fair considera-
tion similarly protected acquirers of property from an insolvent debtor.
35
Good faith preferences had independent immunity. 36 A preference was a
payment received from an insolvent who lacked the resources to pay all of
his or her debts. 37 A "good faith preference" could not exceed the unpaid
balance of a debt. 38 A creditor also could not benefit a debtor other than
through a pro tanto discharge of the debt paid. Allowing a debtor to retain
control of transferred property, for example, created a voidable bad faith
27. Id. at 263, 42 S.W. at 964 (dictum).
28. See id. (at time of decision third category of persons with standing was other persons
entitled to property).
29. TFTA, supra note 1, § 24.03(a), (b).
30. Id. § 24.03(a).
31. 83 S.W.2d 1072 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1935, writ dism'd).
32. Id. at 1074-75.
33. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. The omission of substantial assets but no
debts from the definition of insolvency favored creditors over debtors. This procreditor act of
the Republic of Texas was diametrically opposed to the legislation freeing Texas citizens of
debts contracted in. other countries that has been attributed to the Republic, but, in fact, never
existed. See TEXAS IN 1837, at 161-62 & 217 n.24 (Muir paperback 2d ed. 1988).
34. TFTA, supra note 1, § 24.02(b).
35. See Adams v. Williams, 112 Tex. 469, 475-78, 248 S.W. 673, 674-77 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1923, opinion adopted) (existence of valuable consideration precluded voidability).
36. E.g., Hawes v. Central Texas Prod. Credit Ass'n, 503 S.W.2d 234, 235-37 (Tex. 1973)
(good faith preference exception to voidability of transfers with actual intent to defraud inap-
plicable due to transferee's bad faith); Adams, 112 Tex. at 476-77, 248 S.W. at 676 (good faith
preference exception to voidability of transfers for unfair consideration by insolvents).
37. See Hawes, 503 S.W.2d at 235. A debtor's motive for making a preferential payment
is usually obvious. E.g., Karr v. Cockerham, 71 S.W.2d 905, 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1934, writ dism'd) (wife preferred creditor).




A person with standing ostensibly had to commence a voiding action
within four years after he or she should have discovered a fraudulent trans-
fer.4° An aggrieved person, however, could circumvent this statute of limita-
tions by asserting voidability through levy upon the transferred property.
Depending upon whether a levy was pursuant to a provisional remedy, 41 a
prior judgment against a debtor,42 or a prior judgment lien in a debtor's
nonexempt real estate, 43 the levy was subject to either the statute of limita-
tions upon a substantive claim against a debtor," or one of the ten-year
statutes of limitations upon enforcement of a judgment.4 5 In order to sell
the transferred property an aggrieved person who levied in disregard of a
fraudulent transfer ordinarily had to purchase at his or her own execution
sale and to prevail in a subsequent action to remove the fraudulent transfer
as a cloud upon title.46 The statute of limitations upon an action to clear
title consequently restricted the ability to levy in disregard of a fraudulent
transfer.
An aggrieved party with reason to know of a fraudulent transfer had two
years to bring an action to clear title to personal property. 47 Principles of
39. Id. at 235-37.
40. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (Vernon 1986) (four-year statute of
limitations); Hoerster v. Wilke, 158 S.W.2d 288, 289-90 (Tex. 1942) (dictum) (statute of limita-
tions commences when fraudulent transfer could have been discovered by exercise of reason-
able diligence).
41. An aggrieved person without a judgment can couple an action upon his or her sub-
stantive claim with a prejudgment attachment proceeding. E.g., Snodgrass v. Brownfield State
Bank, 251 S.W. 567, 568-69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1923, no writ) (attaching creditor has
standing to void).
42. E.g., Lynn v. Le Gierse & Co., 48 Tex. 138, 140 (1877) (judgment creditor can cause
levy of execution upon fraudulently transferred property).
43. E.g., Fikes v. Buckholts State Bank, 273 S.W. 957, 959-61 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1925, writ dism'd) (levy of execution upon and execution sale of nonexempt real estate subject
to judgment lien). A judgment lien also could be enforced by an equitable foreclosure action.
E.g., Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 53-55 (Tex. 1964) (equitable action to foreclose
judgment lien in nonexempt real estate maintainable notwithstanding expiration of four-year
statute of limitations for voiding actions by creditors without a judgment).
44. See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 61.003 (Vernon 1986) (provisional
remedy of attachment available only in connection with a pending suit).
45. With respect to enforcement of a judgment by writ of execution, the judgment creditor
must obtain and issue an initial writ within 10 years after the date of rendition. Subsequent
writs must follow within 10 years after issue of the previous writ. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 34.001 (Vernon 1986). With respect to enforcement of judgment liens in nonex-
empt real estate obtained by recording and indexing abstracts of money judgments in county
land records, the statute of limitations is either 10 years from the date of recording and index-
ing or the date upon which a writ of execution becomes unavailable, whichever occurs earlier.
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 52.001, .003, .006 (Vernon 1984).
46. Lynn v. Le Gierse & Co., 48 Tex. 138, 140 (1877) (judgment creditor who levied in
disregard of fraudulent transfer and purchased at execution sale prevailed in subsequent action
to clear title).
47. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (Vernon 1986) (two-year stat-
ute of limitations upon conversion of personal property, and taking or detaining the personal
property of another). See also Bonhiver v. Affiliated Cos., 447 F.2d 108, 111-12 (5th Cir. 1971)
(creditor's action against transferees of debtor's personal property barred by two-year statute
of limitations). Bonhiver involved assertion of a transferee's personal liability for participation
in a fraudulent transfer rather than an action to quiet title to personal property that had been
levied upon in disregard of a transfer. 447 F.2d at 111. The court consequently erred in
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adverse possession determined whether an action to clear title to real estate
was maintainable. 48 The Texas durational requirements for adverse posses-
sion, which are phrased as statutes of limitations upon actions against an
adverse possessor, include: (1) within three years after a cause of action
accrues against a peaceable adverse possessor with either title or color of
title,49 (2) within five years after a cause of action accrues against a peaceable
adverse possessor using property, paying taxes, and claiming under a re-
corded deed that is not tainted by forgery,50 and (3) within ten years after a
cause of action accrues against a peaceable adverse possessor using the prop-
erty.5' As long as a transferee took possession, the three-year adverse pos-
session statute of limitations frequently applied to transfers made with actual
fraudulent intent. A person intending to defraud creditors usually took care
to convey record title.52 Depending upon the circumstances, adverse posses-
sion, nevertheless, could require from three to ten years. 53
With the exception of the fraudulent gift provision, the legislature pro-
spectively repealed the Texas Fraudulent Transfer Act as of September 1,
1987.5 4 The Texas Act in its entirety continues to apply to transfers made
prior to that date. 55 The gift provision, stripped of superfluous references to
fraud, incongruously remains in the Texas Business and Commerce Code.56
The standards for a valid gift of tangible personal property should be in the
Property Code.
II. THE UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT
A. The Approach of the UFTA
The UFTA, which the Uniform Law Conference approved in 1984, mod-
ernizes the UFCA by incorporating federal Bankruptcy Code principles. 57
In addition to transfers made by a debtor with actual intent to defraud credi-
applying the two-year statute of limitations. See Colonial Leasing Co. v. Logistics Control
Group Int'l, 762 F.2d 454, 456-58 (5th Cir. 1985) (unprotected transferee's personal liability
for participation in fraudulent transfer subject to four-year statute of limitations).
48. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.030 (Vernon 1986); see Hoerster v. Wilke,
158 S.W.2d 288, 289-90 (Tex. 1942) (otherwise unprotected transferee of real estate had ac-
quired title by adverse possession).
49. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.024 (Vernon 1986).
50. Id. § 16.025.
51. Id. § 16.026.
52. E.g., Oates v. Johnson, 96 S.W.2d 1119 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1936, writ ref'd)
(gratuitous deed from husband to wife made three-year statute of limitations applicable).
53. The twenty-five-year adverse possession statutes of limitations, TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.027, 16.028 (Vernon 1986), were irrelevant. The ten-year statutes of
limitations upon enforcement of a judgment, supra note 45, ordinarily ran before the twenty-
five-year adverse possession statutes of limitations could come into play.
54. Act of Sept. 1, 1987, ch. 1004, § 3, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 3394.
55. Id. §2.
56. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.013 (Vernon 1987).
57. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT prefatory note, 7A U.L.A. 640, 640-42




tors,58 there are three types of transfers for less than reasonably equivalent
value that the UFTA deems constructively fraudulent without proof of a
debtor's fraudulent intent. They are: (1) transfers leaving a debtor with un-
reasonably small assets for the transaction or business in which the debtor
either is engaged or is about to engage;59 (2) transfers by a debtor who either
intended to incur, believed that he or she would incur, or reasonably should
have believed that he or she would incur debts that could not be repaid as
they became due;6° and (3) transfers by a debtor who either was insolvent or
became insolvent as a result of the transfer.61
Although preferences are not traditional fraudulent transfers, the UFTA
also deems constructively fraudulent certain preferences. An insolvent's
out-of-the-ordinary-course transfer for an antecedent debt to an insider who
has reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent is voidable.62 The draft-
ers intended this new limitation upon the former immunity of good faith
preferences 63 to deter strategically placed and knowledgeable insiders from
stripping a debtor of assets.64 The UFTA also declares that enforcement of
a valid clause authorizing termination of a lease because of a debtor's default
and enforcement of an article 9 security interest in compliance with article 9,
which can give rise to transfers for less than reasonably equivalent value,65
are not constructively fraudulent transfers.66
An illustrative UFTA definition, which derives from the Bankruptcy
Code, identifies "insiders" as persons with a close relationship with a
debtor.67 Other important UFTA definitions include "insolvency" and
"value." The definition of insolvency is an adaptation of the Bankruptcy
Code balance sheet test.68 If a fair valuation of a debtor's debts exceeds a
fair valuation of a debtor's assets, insolvency exists.69 A rebuttable presump-
tion of insolvency, moreover, arises from a debtor's general nonpayment of
58. UFTA § 4(a)(1), 7A U.L.A. at 652. The UFTA identifies eleven nonexclusive factors
as relevant to the existence of actual fraudulent intent. UFTA § 4(b), 7A U.L.A. at 653.
59. UFTA § 4(a)(2)(i), 7A U.L.A. at 653.
60. UFTA § 4(a)(2)(ii), 7A U.L.A. at 653.
61. UFTA § 5(a), 7A U.L.A. at 657.
62. UFTA §§ 5(b), 8(f), 7A U.L.A. at 657, 662-63.
63. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. Good faith preferences to outsiders
and good faith preferences to insiders without reason to believe a debtor insolvent remain
unvoidable. See UFTA §§ 5(b), 8(f), 7A U.L.A. at 657, 662-63.
64. See UFTA prefatory note, 7A U.L.A. at 641.
65. See In re Ferris, 415 F. Supp. 33, 39-41 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (discussing fair considera-
tion under the Bankruptcy Act, the forerunner of "reasonably equivalent value" under the
Bankruptcy Code).
66. UFTA § 8(e), 7A U.L.A. at 662.
67. UFTA § 1(7) & § I comment, 7A U.L.A. at 644-45, 647.
68. UFTA § 2 comment, 7A U.L.A. at 648.
69. UFTA § 2(a) & § 2 comment, 7A U.L.A. at 648. All of a debtor's property ordinarily
constitutes an asset with the exception of property that is (1) encumbered by a valid lien,
(2) generally exempt from judicial seizure by creditors, or (3) held in tenancy by the entirety
and not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant. UFTA § 1(2),
7A U.L.A. at 644. The UFTA also excludes from a solvency calculation property that was
involved in a fraudulent transfer and debts secured by liens that precluded property from being
considered an asset. UFTA § 2(d), (e), 7A U.L.A. at 648.
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debts as they become due.70 General nonpayment does not require default
upon a majority in number and amount of debts. Nonpayment of large
debts can suffice. 71 A failure to pay debts that are the subject of a bona fide
dispute, however, is irrelevant. 72
Value includes an antecedent debt secured or satisfied by a transfer.73
With this traditional fraudulent transfer law exception, the UFTA requires
that value have utility to a debtor's creditors.74 An unperformed, out-of-the-
ordinary-course-of-business promise to care for either a debtor or another,
which both is easily fabricated and has little utility to a debtor's creditors,
for example, is not value. 75 With respect to all constructively fraudulent
transfers, reasonably equivalent value includes acquisition of a debtor's in-
terest in an asset "pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclo-
sure sale or execution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of
the interest of the debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or
security agreement." '76
This definition of reasonably equivalent value rejects the controversial
Fifth Circuit construction of federal bankruptcy law in Durrett v. Washing-
ton National Insurance Co.77 Durrett held constructively fraudulent a fore-
closure sale realizing less than seventy percent of the fair market value of an
insolvent's property.78 Under the UFTA, any price received at a noncollu-
sive and regular foreclosure sale is reasonable. 79
The UFTA limits standing to void to creditors 80-persons with claims,
which are rights to payment.81 Only creditors with claims arising before a
transfer can void preferences to insiders and transfers by insolvents for less
than reasonably equivalent value. 82 A transfer, however, is not deemed
made until a debtor acquires rights in the transferred property 83 and the
transfer is perfected against third parties.84 A delay in perfection can, there-
fore, increase the number of persons with standing to void. Both pre- and
70. UFTA § 2(b), 7A U.L.A. at 648.
71. UFTA § 2 comment, 7A U.L.A. at 649.
72. Id.
73. UFrA § 3(a), 7A U.L.A. at 650.
74. UFTA § 3 comment, 7A U.L.A. at 650-51. The comment explains that value is to be
determined in light of the purpose of the Act to protect a debtor's estate from being depleted to
the prejudice of unsecured creditors. Consideration having no utility from a creditor's stand-
point does not satisfy the statute. Id.
75. UFTA § 3(a), 7A U.L.A. at 650.
76. UFTA § 3(b), 7A U.L.A. at 650.
77. 621 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1980).
78. Id. at 203-04. Although Durrett was decided under the Bankruptcy Act, the Durrett
reasoning controls in the Fifth Circuit under the Bankruptcy Code. E.g., In re Willis, 48
Bankr. 295, 300-01 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985) (Circuit Judge Randall sitting by designation)
(Durrett followed under § 548).
79. See UFTA § 3 comment, 7A U.L.A. at 652.
80. UFTA §§ 4(a), 5, 7A U.L.A. at 652-53, 657.
81. UFTA §§ 1(3), (4), 7A U.L.A. at 644.
82. UFTA § 5, 7A U.L.A. at 657.
83. UFTA § 6(4), 7A U.L.A. at 659.
84. UFTA § 6(1), 7A U.L.A. at 658-59. A debtor must have acquired rights in an asset
for perfection to be possible. UFTA § 6(4), 7A U.L.A. at 659. Additionally, transferees of
real estate must perfect against subsequent bona fide purchasers from the debtor, and transfer-
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post-transfer creditors, moreover, can void a transfer that a debtor made
with actual fraudulent intent or that falls within the unreasonably small as-
sets or foreseeable excessive debt categories of constructive fraud. 85
Good faith recipients of a fraudulent transfer from a debtor are protected
from voidability to the extent that they increased the debtor's assets. 86 An
exchange of reasonably equivalent value is necessary for complete protec-
tion.87 Subsequent acquirers of fraudulently transferred property do not
deal with a debtor. Their remoteness from a fraudulent transfer rather than
their augmentation of a debtor's assets justifies protection.8 8 Without regard
to equivalency, all subsequent acquirers who gave value to their transferors
in good faith have complete protection.8 9 The transferees eligible for protec-
tion include persons who have acquired liens in a debtor's property.90
Under the UFTA, good faith means lack of information that a transfer
either was engaged in by a debtor with actual fraudulent intent or was con-
structively fraudulent. An UFTA official comment, for example, states:
Knowledge of the facts rendering the transfer voidable would be incon-
sistent with the good faith that is required of a protected transferee ....
An insider who receives property or an obligation from an insolvent
debtor as security for or in satisfaction of an antecedent debt of the
transferor or obligor is not a good faith transferee or obligee if the in-
sider has reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the
time the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred. 91
The UFTA has three statutes of limitations. A creditor must bring an
action to void a preference to an insider within one year after a transfer is
deemed made.92 Actions with respect to all other types of constructive fraud
are timely within four years after a transfer is deemed made.93 Finally, a
claimant can bring an action to void a transfer made with actual fraudulent
intent either within four years after the transfer is deemed made or within
one year after the claimant reasonably could have discovered the transfer,
whichever is later.94
ees of personal property and fixtures must perfect against subsequent judicial lien creditors of
the debtor. UFTA § 6(1), 7A U.L.A. at 658-59.
85. UFTA § 4(a), 7A U.L.A. at 652-53.
86. UFTA §§ 8(b)(1), (d), 7A U.L.A. at 662.
87. See UFTA § 8(a), 7A U.L.A. at 662.
88. See Bonded Fin. Serv., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 896-97 (7th Cir.
1988) (subsequent acquirer need not give value to debtor in order to qualify for protection
under Bankruptcy Code).
89. UFTA § 8(b)(2), 7A U.L.A. at 662.
90. A "transfer" includes "creation of a lien or other encumbrance," UFTA § 1(12), 7A
U.L.A. at 645, so that transferees include creditors that have acquired liens in a debtor's
property.
91. UFTA § 8 comment, 7A U.L.A. at 663-64; see also Bonded Fin. Serv., 838 F.2d at
897-98 (transferee that lacks information required to support inference of knowledge has no
duty to investigate).
92. UFTA § 9(c), 7A U.L.A. 665 (1985).
93. UFTA § 9(b), 7A U.L.A. at 665.
94. UFTA § 9(a), 7A U.L.A. at 665.
19891 1037
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
B. The Significance of the UFTA
The UFTA has transformed Texas fraudulent transfer law. Dramatic re-
versals in policy include repudiation of the antiquated 1840 definition of in-
solvency95 and the new voidability of out-of-the-ordinary-course preferences
to insiders with reasonable cause to believe a debtor insolvent. 96 Additional
significant changes include the declaration that transfers for less than rea-
sonably equivalent value by debtors either left with unreasonably small as-
sets or contemplating excessive debts are constructively fraudulent, 97 and
the requirement that consideration ordinarily have utility to a debtor's credi-
tors in order to constitute value. 98 The jury charge in Owen v. Vibrosearch
Exploration. Inc.99 that fair consideration under the Texas Fraudulent
Transfer act included "assumption of, satisfaction of or release of a pre-ex-
isting debt of another'1°° is erroneous under the UFTA. 10 1
The immunity of noncollusive and regular foreclosure sales from attack as
constructively fraudulent transfers, 10 2 on the other hand, is not a reversal in
policy. The Texas Fraudulent Transfer Act was limited to voluntary trans-
fers. 103 The coverage of involuntary as well as voluntary fraudulent trans-
fers by the UFTA1°4 made an anti-Durrett provision necessary. The new
coverage of involuntary transfers also explains the exclusion from construc-
tive fraud of lease terminations for default under enforceable termination
clauses and foreclosure proceedings in conformity with article 9.105 An
otherwise proper lease termination or article 9 foreclosure proceeding that
cloaks a debtor's actual intent to defraud creditors, however, is voidable as
under prior law. 10 6
The UFTA simplifies and clarifies numerous other aspects of fraudulent
transfer law. Three specific and frequently shorter statues of limitations, for
example, replace the previous smorgasbord of limitations periods. 10 7 Due to
95. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.003 (Vernon 1987) (debtor deemed
insolvent if total debts are greater than total assets at fair valuation) with TFTA § 24.03
(debtor deemed insolvent if lacking sufficient property in the state subject to execution to pay
total debts); see also supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (discussing the TFTA version).
96. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 24.006(b), .009(f) (Vernon 1987) (trans-
fer fraudulent and voidable if made to insider, if debtor was insolvent at time of transfer, and
insider had reasonable cause to know of insolvency unless transfer falls within 1 of 3 excep-
tions including transfers made in the ordinary course of business) with supra notes 36-39 and
accompanying text (good faith preferences not voidable).
97. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005(a)(2) (Vernon 1987).
98. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. Although the UFTA does not have a
comprehensive definition of value, an official comment states that consideration having no
utility to the creditors of a debtor is not value. UFTA § 3 comment, 7A U.L.A. at 650-51.
99. 694 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
100. Id. at 424.
101. Although the record in Vibrosearch indicated that some of the consideration for the
transfer benefited the debtor, the trial court's jury charge did not require this. Id.
102. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.004(b) (Vernon 1987).
103. See supra notes 14 & 15 and accompanying text.
104. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.002(12) (Vernon 1987) (transfers include
involuntary as well as voluntary dispositions of interests in assets).
105. See id. § 24.009(e).
106. See id.; see also supra notes 14 & 15 and accompanying text (discussing prior law).
107. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.010(a) (Vernon 1987) (providing claim-
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the UFTA's congruency with federal bankruptcy law,' 0 8 the burgeoning
case law under the Bankruptcy Code fraudulent transfer provisions, more-
over, is persuasive authority concerning the meaning of Texas law.1i9
III. THE TEXAS NONUNIFORM AMENDMENTS
There are eleven Texas nonuniform amendments to the UFTA. Most re-
quire corrective legislative action.
A. The Four Senate Posthearing Amendments Pertaining to Family Law
The basic nonuniform amendment pertaining to family law defines a claim
as arising from a right to property as well as a right to payment.' 10 This
nonuniform amendment retains the standing of a spouse to void a fraudulent
transfer of community property that existed under the Texas Fraudulent
Transfer Act. I I I A companion nonuniform amendment states that creditors
include a spouse, minor, or ward who has a claim."12 This expression of
legislative intent indicates that only the rights to property of spouses, mi-
nors, and wards can constitute claims.
The nonuniform definition of claim has limited significance. If an ag-
grieved family member seeks monetary compensation for a fraudulent trans-
fer, the spouse, minor, or ward is asserting a right to payment that
constitutes a claim under the uniform text of the UFTA."13 If fraudulently
transferred property either cannot be found or is owned by a fully protected
ant with four years or, if later, one year after transfer could be reasonably discovered if transfer
made with intent to hinder or defraud; four years if transfer made without receiving reasonably
equivalent value; and, one year if transfer made to insider) with supra text accompanying notes
40-53 (setting forth periods for voiding fraudulent transfers along with numerous caveats de-
pending on the existence of a levy on the property, means of the levy, and other factors). The
shorter UFTA statutes of limitations can confer greater protection upon transferees of real
estate than principles of adverse possession. For a discussion of adverse possession, see supra
notes 48-53 and accompanying text. But see Hoerster v. Wilke, 158 S.W.2d 288-90 (Tex. 1942)
(expiration of three-year limitations period for ousting adverse possessor of real estate under
color of title precluded subsequent voiding action that otherwise would have been timely).
108. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
109. A major exception is the Texas bankruptcy courts' adherence to the Fifth Circuit
Durrett decision under the Bankruptcy Code. E.g., In re Jackson, 76 Bankr. 597, 599-600
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (voiding foreclosure sale of chapter 13 debtor's home for 47% of
appraised value). The UFTA rejects the Durrett constructive fraud principle. See supra notes
76-79 and accompanying text.
110. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.002(3) (Vernon 1987).
111. See 87 TEX. ST. B. FAMILY LAW SECTION REPORTS 59-60 (No. 4 1987) (UFTA
"jeopardized the entire statutory underpinning of the rules against fraudulent disposition of
community property"); see also supra text accompanying notes 25-28 (discussing wife's
standing).
112. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.002(4) (Vernon 1987). The second nonuniform
amendment does not alter the UFTA definition of claim. Compare id. § 24.002(3) (claim
means right to payment or property) with UFTA § 1(3), 7A U.L.A. 644 (claim means right to
payment).
113. See UFTA § 1(3), 7A U.L.A. at 644; see also In re Delta Smelting & Ref. Alaska, Inc.,
53 Bankr. 877, 881-82 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1985) (owner who was unable to identify gold bars
that had been delivered for processing had claim for their value under Bankruptcy Code).




transferee, the recovery of monetary compensation from an unprotected per-
son, moreover, is the only remedy available. 114 The nonuniform amendment
expands standing to sue under the UFTA only if an aggrieved spouse, minor,
or ward seeks recovery of identifiable fraudulently transferred property from
an unprotected transferee.
A third nonuniform family law amendment imposes a special statute of
limitations upon voiding actions by spouses, minors, and wards." 5 The lim-
itations period is either two years from accrual of a cause of action or within
one year after a claimant could reasonably have discovered a fraudulent
transfer, whichever is later.' 1 6 With respect to transfers of community prop-
erty made with actual intent to defraud a spouse, the type of transfer of
paramount concern to the proponents, this nonuniform amendment shortens
the UFTA limitation period.1 7 Under the UFTA, creditors can void a
transfer made with actual fraudulent intent either within four years after a
cause of action accrues or, if later, within one year after a claimant could
reasonably have discovered the transfer." 8
The special statute of limitations is also shorter than the comparable
UFTA statute of limitations with respect to all constructively fraudulent
transfers except preferences to insiders. The UFTA limitations period for
most constructively fraudulent transfers is four years.' 19 Preferences to in-
siders alone have a one-year statute of limitations under the UFTA. ' 20 Pref-
erences to insiders, however, primarily injure unsecured creditors who are
not insiders.1 2 ' Preferences to insiders are not of paramount concern to
spouses, minors, and wards, who typically are insiders. 122 The period within
which spouses, minors, and wards can void insider preferences should not
have been extended to two years by the nonuniform statute of limitations.
A fourth nonuniform amendment pertaining to family law limits the ex-
clusion of property held in tenancy by the entirety from the definition of
asset to property subject to the law of another jurisdiction. 23 Tenancy by
the entirety is a common law marital property interest derived from the
"aged and outmoded fiction" that a husband and wife are a single legal en-
tity. 124 The nonuniform amendment reflects the fact that Texas spouses cus-
114. 5ee In re Delta Smelting, 53 Bankr. at 881-82 (owner of unidentifiable gold bars un-
secured creditor of processor of bars).
115. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.010(b) (Vernon 1987).
116. Id.
117. Biccochi v. Casey-Swasey Co., 91 Tex. 259, 42 S.W. 963 (1897), the paradigm case
under the Texas Fraudulent Transfer Act, involved a diversion of community funds by a hus-
band with actual fraudulent intent. For a discussion of Biccochi, see supra notes 26-28 and
accompanying text.
118. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.010(a)(1) (Vernon 1987).
119. Id. § 24.010(a)(2).
120. Id. § 24.010(a)(3).
121. Cf In re Hartley, 825 F.2d 1067, 1070-71 (6th Cir. 1987) (injurious Bankruptcy Code
preferences diminish the assets available for distribution to unsecured creditors).
122. For the concept of an insider, see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
123. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.002(2)(C) (Vernon 1987).
124. In re Townsend, 72 Bankr. 960, 961-63 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987).
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tomarily hold property acquired during marriage as community property. 125
B. The Four Senate Posthearing Amendments Pertaining to Transferees
A nonuniform amendment to the definition of "value" provides: "'Rea-
sonably equivalent value' includes without limitation, a transfer or obliga-
tion that is within the range of values for which the transferor would have
wilfully sold the assets in an arms length transaction."'' 26
By emphasizing that property can have a range of reasonable values, the
Senate apparently sought to enhance the protection of persons who negotiate
a voluntary purchase of a debtor's property. This nonuniform amendment
does not displace the UFTA provisions declaring that the prices obtained at
noncollusive and regular foreclosure sales are reasonably equivalent value' 27
and that out-of-the-ordinary-course-of-business, executory promises to pro-
vide support to a debtor or another person do not constitute value.'2 8 With-
out a special statutory provision, case law under section 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code, upon which the UFTA is modeled, recognizes that there
can be more than one reasonable voluntary sale price.' 29 The legislature
should either repeal this unnecessary amendment or redraft it to more
clearly express its limited function.
To the extent of the value given a debtor for an asset, UFTA section 8(d)
protects good faith recipients of voidable transfers.' 30 Protected transferees
have the option of either (1) asserting a lien in or a right to retain a trans-
ferred asset; (2) enforcing an obligation incurred by a debtor; or (3) reducing
the amount of their liability upon a judgment against them. '3' Three
nonuniform amendments address these transferee protection provisions.
Two of the amendments make the UFTA policy explicit. The first states
that the method of protection is "at the transferee's ... election.' 32 The
second describes a protective lien as "prior to the creditor's claim."' 33 The
creditor referred to is a voiding creditor, and the reference is to a voiding
creditor's rights under the UFTA. The legislature should revise the amend-
ment to read: "prior to the voiding creditor's rights under this chapter." The
third nonuniform amendment derives from the Bankruptcy Code improve-
ments-lien concept. 134 The amendment follows the Bankruptcy Code slav-
ishly, copying a reference to a bankruptcy trustee, 35 and ignoring
125. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01(b) (Vernon -1975).
126. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.004(d) (Vernon 1987).
127. Id. § 24.004(b); see supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
128. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.004(a) (Vernon 1987).
129. See, e.g., In re Ananko, 89 Bankr. 399, 407 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988) (normal selling price
between $185,000 and $190,000); In re Morris Communications NC Inc., 75 Bankr. 619, 628
(Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1987) (dictum) (better reasoned cases eschew strict percentage test and
examine all circumstances surrounding transfer in evaluating whether fair economic exchange
occurred).
130. UFTA § 8(d), 7A U.L.A. at 662.
131. Id.
132. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.009(d)(1) (Vernon 1987).
133. Id. § 24.009(d)(l)(A).
134. 11 U.S.C. § 550(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
135. Compare id. § 550(d)(2)(D) with TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.009(d)(2)(D)
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differences between the UFTA and the Bankruptcy Code.
A voiding creditor's standard remedy under the UFTA is a personal judg-
ment against an unprotected transferee. 136 A voiding creditor can recover a
judgment for the lesser of the amount necessary to satisfy his or her claim
and the adjusted value of an asset at the time of transfer. 37 A voiding credi-
tor can enforce a judgment against the nonexempt assets of an unprotected
transferee, including the fraudulently transferred property. 138
A voiding creditor who is willing to risk tort liability has the option of
proceeding immediately against fraudulently transferred property.1 39 The
UFTA permits use of a provisional remedy to seize fraudulently transferred
property prior to voiding. 40 With court permission, a judgment creditor of
a debtor also can summarily levy execution upon a transferred asset or its
proceeds. 41 A cautious voiding creditor, however, proves standing,
voidability, and a transferee's lack of protection prior to seizure of any prop-
erty. After a personal judgment against a transferee memorializes this proof,
the creditor can enforce the judgment against any property of the transferee
that is subject to execution. The fraudulently transferred property need not
be seized. If that property is worth a great deal more than a voiding credi-
tor's judgment,1 42 the property, indeed, should not be seized. Under these
circumstances, levy of execution upon the fraudulently transferred property
could constitute an excessive levy.' 43
A bankruptcy trustee is far more likely than a voiding creditor to seize
fraudulently transferred property. Court permission is required to obtain
any other remedy. 44 A trustee is entitled to recover the full value of fraudu-
lently transferred property from any unprotected transferee.145 A turnover
order also simplifies litigation by making valuation of a fraudulently trans-
ferred asset unnecessary. 146
In order to prevent an unjustified windfall, the Bankruptcy Code gives a
good faith transferee a lien securing the amount by which his or her expendi-
tures for improvements have increased the value of an asset recovered by a
bankruptcy trustee. 47 When a bankruptcy trustee sells recovered property
(Vernon 1987) (improvements include payment of debt secured by lien superior or equal to
rights of trustee).
136. UFTA § 8(b) preamble, 7A U.L.A. at 662.
137. UFrA § 8(b) preamble, (c), 7A U.L.A. at 662.
138. See UFTA §§ 7(a)(2), (3), 8(b), 7A U.L.A. at 660, 662.
139. See Kimbrough v. Bevering, 182 S.W. 403, 405-06 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1915, no writ) (constable and sureties upon constable's bond liable in tort for wrongful levy
under judgment against tenant upon cotton subject to landlord's prior lien).
140. UFTA § 7(a)(2), 7A U.L.A. at 660.
141. UFTA § 7(b), 7A U.L.A. at 660.
142. Even though a fraudulently transferred asset is worth more, a judgment cannot exceed
the dollar amount of a voiding creditor's claim. UFTA § 8(b), 7A U.L.A. at 662.
143. See Cornelius v. Burford, 28 Tex. 202, 209-10 (1866) (dictum) (sheriff or constable
could be liable in damages to judgment debtor for levy of execution upon excessive property).
144. See 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
145. See id. ("trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred").
146. See, e.g., In re Vedaa, 49 Bankr. 409, 411 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) (courts favor return
of property itself to avoid speculation over value).
147. 11 U.S.C. § 550(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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that is subject to an improvements lien, the trustee must satisfy the secured
obligation in order to convey good title. The Bankruptcy Code broadly de-
fines improvements to include taxes paid and payments upon unavoidable
senior liens. 148 Substantial expenditures by a good faith transferee that do
not affect the value of a recovered asset, however, are not improvements. 149
Payment of the purchase price for unencumbered property to a debtor, for
example, does not give rise to an improvements line.' 50
In view of the relative frequency with which bankruptcy trustees recover
and sell fraudulently transferred property, the Bankruptcy Code improve-
ments lien is a reasonable method of protecting good faith transferees.
Although the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly provide for a comparable
reduction in the amount of a trustee's judgment for the value of an asset, the
policy of the improvements-lien provision requires a reduction. 15 1
A voiding creditor under the UFTA typically obtains a judgment against
an unprotected transferee, 152 but this is not invariably the case. A court can
authorize seizure of a fraudulently transferred asset. 153 Where the remedy is
a money judgment for the value of the property, the UFTA protects a trans-
feree/improver by limiting the judgment to the value of the asset "at the
time of the transfer, subject to adjustment as the equities may require."' 154
Time-of-transfer valuation necessarily excludes the value of subsequent im-
provements by a good faith transferee. Where the remedy is recovery of the
property, the UFTA, however, does not provide for comparable protection
of a bona fide transferee/improver.' 5 5 In order to rectify this omission, a
Texas nonuniform amendment added the Bankruptcy Code improvements
lien provisions to the UFTA. 156
The drafters, however, made two serious errors. The UFTA provision
entitling a transferee to a reduction in the amount of the judgment seems to
have been expanded to include the value of improvements by a transferee. 157
Because an UFTA judgment excludes the value of improvements ab ini-
tio,158 this additional reduction creates an unwarranted double credit for im-
provements. More importantly, the wording of the nonuniform amendment
obscures good faith transferees' rights to protection for the value they have
exchanged for an otherwise voidable transfer.159 Because good faith trans-
148. Id. § 550(d)(2).
149. See id.
150. See In re Brown Family Farms, Inc., 80 Bankr. 404, 406, 413-14 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1987) (transferee's payment of debt secured by other property of debtor as part of purchase
price not an improvement).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48.
152. See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
153. UFTA § 7(a)(2), (b), 7A U.L.A. at 660.
154. UFTA § 8(c), 7A U.L.A. at 662.
155. Although an official comment endorses the concept of the Bankruptcy Code improve-
ments lien, the UFTA does not create a comparable lien. See UFTA § 8 comment, 7A U.L.A.
at 662-63.
156. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.009(d)(1), (2) (Vernon 1987).
157. See id. § 24.009(d)(1)(C).
158. See id. § 24.009(c).
159. See id. § 24.009(d)(1).
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ferees are more likely to give value for property than to improve it, this is a
major omission.' 60 The amendment should be revised to assure good faith
transferees protection for the value that they have exchanged for a debtor's
property and to preclude double credit for the value of improvements.
C. The Three Senate Floor Amendments 16 1
A Senate floor amendment alters the circumstances under which a rebut-
table presumption of insolvency arises. The UFTA requires proof that a
debtor "is generally not paying his or her debts as they become due."'162 The
Texas nonuniform amendment, however, requires proof that a debtor "is
generally not able to pay the debtor's debts as they become due." 16 3
The proponents of this nonuniform amendment argued that debtors could
have legitimate reasons for nonpayment of debts. An UFTA official com-
ment makes the same point: "A presumption of insolvency does not arise
from nonpayment of a debt as to which there is a genuine bona fide dispute,
even though the debt is a substantial part of the debtor's indebtedness." 64
Restoration of the uniform text in accordance with this official comment
would effectuate the goal of the nonuniform amendment. Restoration of the
uniform text would also obviate the unnecessary evidentiary burdens the
amendment creates. Comparing the value and liquidity of all of a debtor's
assets with the maturity of all of a debtor's debts is a cumbersome method of
determining insolvency. 165 A debtor's payment record with respect to debts
that are not in dispute is a more direct and objective measure of the capacity
to pay debts.
A second Senate floor amendment limits standing to void transfers made
with actual fraudulent intent and two types of core constructively fraudulent
transfers to creditors who acquired a claim "within a reasonable time before
or after the transfer."' 66 The proponents of this nonuniform amendment
expressed concern that the UFTA would extend the period of jeopardy for
160. A cash purchase price that is paid to a debtor, for example, is not an improvement.
See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
161. These amendments were first proposed when the UFTA came up for a final Senate
vote at the end of the legislative session. Due to the extremely crowded Senate calendar, there
was no time for discussion. Any controversy would have prevented passage of the bill. The
sponsors decided to accept the floor amendments and to propose necessary corrections in the
next legislative session. H.B. 154, 71st Tex. Legislature (1989), the bill containing the
corrective amendments, however, was not reported by the Calendars Committee of the Texas
House of Representatives.
162. UFTA § 2(b), 7A U.L.A. at 648.
163. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.003(b) (Vernon 1987).
164. UFTA § 2 comment, 7A U.L.A. at 649.
165. The UFTA presumption eases the burden of proving balance sheet insolvency. The
nonuniform amendment, on the other hand, reinstitutes the onerous UFCA concept of insol-
vency. Compare id. (lesser burden for balance sheet insolvency) with Furniture Mfrs. Sales,
Inc. v. Deamer, 680 P.2d 398, 400 (Utah 1984) (UFCA insolvency requires valuation of all
debtor's nonexempt property and showing that it is insufficient to pay debts as they become
due).
166. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005(a) preamble (Vernon 1987).
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voidable preferences under the federal Bankruptcy Code. 167  The
nonuniform amendment, however, has no effect upon constructively fraudu-
lent preferences to insiders. The amendment applies only to transfers made
with actual fraudulent intent and to transfers for less than reasonably
equivalent value by debtors with either unreasonably small capital or fore-
seeable excessive debts. 168
The Senate proponents also asserted that this nonuniform amendment
would prevent creditors with stale claims from harassing a debtor's transfer-
ees. The UFTA, however, achieves this goal directly by displacing the for-
mer ten-year statutes of limitations for levy of execution upon and
foreclosure of judgment liens in fraudulently transferred property. The run-
ning of both the shorter UFTA statutes of limitations and the shorter
nonuniform statute of limitations for voiding by spouses, minors, and wards
extinguish a cause of action 69 and preclude a subsequent seizure of fraudu-
lently transferred property pursuant to a judgment against a debtor. 170
From 1840 to 1987 Texas law allowed creditors who acted within the statute
of limitations to void transfers.' 7 1 The legislature should repeal the addi-
tional "reasonable time" limitation upon standing to void.
A third Senate floor amendment limits constructively fraudulent transfers
to transfers by debtors who either intended to incur or believed that they
would incur debts beyond their ability to make payment as the debts came
due.1 72 The amendment deletes the UFTA's reference to transfers by debt-
ors who reasonably should have believed that they would incur debts beyond
their capacity to repay. 17 3
Proponents of this Senate floor amendment contended that the UFTA lan-
guage was vague. The nonuniform amendment, however, obscures the con-
tinuing relevance of the objective facts of excessive debt and whether or not a
debtor foresaw it. The legislature should restore the uniform text in order to
provide clear notice that objective facts are relevant to a debtor's state-of-
mind concerning excessive debt.
IV. CONCLUSION
The legislature should repeal four of the Texas nonuniform amendments
and amend an additional three. Only the nonuniform amendments includ-
167. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (ninety-day period of jeopardy for
preferences to outsiders; one-year period of jeopardy for preferences to insiders).
168. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005(a) (Vernon 1987).
169. Id. § 24.010.
170. See id. § 24.008(b); Lynn v. Le Gierse & Co., 48 Tex. 138, 140 (1877) (levy and sale
alternative method of voiding). Extinguishment of a cause of action against an unprotected
transferee, of course, does not preclude enforcement of a judgment against nonexempt prop-
erty retained by a debtor. The 10-year statutes of limitations continue to apply to enforcement
of a judgment against property retained by a judgment debtor. For discussion of the 10-year
statutes of limitations, see supra note 45.
171. See TFTA § 24.02(a); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art 3996 (Vernon 1966), repealed by
TFTA.
172. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005(a)(2)(B) (Vernon 1987).
173. UFTA § 4(a)(2)(ii), 7A U.L.A. at 653.
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ing spouses, minors, and wards in the definitions of claim and creditor, 174
referring to tenancy-by-the-entirety property created under the law of an-
other jurisdiction, 175 and giving good faith transferees an express choice con-
cerning the method of protection that they prefer 1 76 should retain their
present form.
The modernization and rationalization of fraudulent transfer law resulting
from enactment of the UFTA overshadows the difficulties posed by the
Texas nonuniform amendments. A majority of the nonuniform amend-
ments, nevertheless, should be either revised or repealed. Until the legisla-
ture acts, the courts should endeavor to harmonize the nonuniform
amendments with the policy of the UFTA.
174. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 132 and accompanying text.
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